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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. GEORGE H. MARTIN,
Appellant.
[1] Searches and Seizures-Justification For.-The presence of
two men in 8 parked automobile on a lover's lane at night
is itself reasonable cause for police investigation, and their
sudden flight from the officers and the inference therefrom
that they are guilty of some crime leaves no doubt as to the
reasonableness and necessity for an investigation, and under
such circumstances it is reasonable for the officers to order
the suspects to put their hands in front of them and to get
out of an automobile to be searched before being questioned.
[2] Id.-Justification For.-Where officers had reasonRble ground
to pursue suspects and, on overtaking them, to order them to
put their hands in front of them, whereupon one officer saw
a small bag in the front seat of an automobile which had been
covered by their hands, he had reasonable cause to believe
that their possession of it prompted their flight and that it
contained contraband, and was therefore justified in taking
it from the car.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County and from an order denying a new trial. Donald
K. Quayle, Judge. JUdgment affirmed; appeal from order
dismissed.
Prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana. Judgment
of conviction affirmed.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
Kelt. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Searches and Seizures, § L
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George H. Martin, in pro. per., and Clinton W. White,
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Appellant.
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EdmundG. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of
one count of possessing marijuana in violation of Health and
Safety Code, section 11500. He also uppeals from an order
that he claims was entered denying his motion for a new
trial. The record, however, does not disclose that a motion
for a new trial was made or that an order denying it was
entered. The latter appeal must therefore be dismissed.
Officers McCann and Price of the Oakland Police Department were on automobile patrol duty during the evening of
July 21, 1954. At about 11 o'clock, while driving in a southerly direction on Poplar Street near 21st Street, they observed
a car parked on the opposite side of the street headed in
the opposite direction. As they passed the car, Officer
McCann turned his spotlight on it and saw two men sitting
in the front seat. He testified: " . . . it is a lover's lane.
If it had been a female and a male I wouldn't have thought
too much of it but two males in that vicinity I figured we
had better check it out and as I brought the patrol car around
to make a U-turn on Poplar Street the suspects' car took
off. They spun their wheels taking off at a high rate of speed.
They turned right onto 21st Street and proceeded up 21st
Street and turned right again on Union Street which would
put them heading in a southern direction again on Union
Street and they turned east on 19th Street and all this time
I had the red light and siren on and I brought the patrol
car on up there on their left rear and very close and stopped
them in front of 1181 - 19th Street." Officer McCann ap-.
pro ached the car from the left, and Officer Price from the
right, and one of them flashed his flashlight into the car.
Robert Dial, who later pleaded guilty to the charge of possession of marijuana, was in the driver's seat. Defendant was
sitting on the right-hand side of the front seat. Dial's right
hand and defendant's left hand were on the center of the
seat. The officers ordered the suspects to put their hands
in front of them, and when they did so Officer McCann saw
a small bag in the middle of the front seat that had been
covered by their hands. The officers ordered the suspects
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out of the car, and after searching them for weapons Officer
McCann reached into the car and took the bag. He examined
it and concluded that it contained marijuana. Later analysis
confirmed this conclusion.
Defendant contends that the search of the automobile
without a warrant was unlawful and that the evidence produced thereby was therefore inadmissible.
[1] Although the presence of two men in a parked automobile on a lover's lane at night was itself reasonable cause
for police investigation (see People v. Simon, 45 Ca1.2d 645,
649-651 [290 P.2d 531J; Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal.App.
13, 16-17 [98 P. 43J), their sudden flight from the officers
and the inference that could reasonably be drawn therefrom
that they were guilty of some crime (United States v. Heitner,
149 F.2d 105, 107), left no doubt not only as to the reasonableness but as to the necessity for an investigation. (Husty
v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-701 [51 S.01. 240, 75
L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407]; Talley v. United States, 159
F.2d 703; Levine v; United States, 138 F.2d 627, 628-629;
Jones v. United States, 131 F.2d 539, 541.) Under these
circumstances the officers were justified in taking precautionary measures to assure their own safety on overtaking
the suspects, and it was therefore reasonable for them to
order the suspects to put their hands in front of them and
to get out of the automobile to be searched for weapons before
being questioned. [2] When Officer McCann saw the bag
that was uncovered when the suspects removed their hands,
he had reasonable cause to believe that their possession of it
prompted the flight and that it contained contraband. He
was therefore justified in taking it from the automobile.
(Oarrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 [45 8. Ct. 280,
69 L.Ed. 543,39 A.L.R. 790] ; Husty v. United States, supra,
282 U.S. 694, 700·701; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251,
255 [59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151] ; Brinegarv. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 165-171 [69 S.01. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879) ; United
States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan Automobile, 167 F.2d
3,7.)
The judgment is affirmed, and the appeal from an alleged
order denying a motion for new trial is dismissed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and
McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-J diss("nt.
It appears to me that the following statement from the
majority opinion is most astounding: "Although the pres-
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ence of two men in a parked automobile on a lover's lane
at night was itself reasonable cause for police investigation .
. . . " There are so many perfectly legitimate reasons why
the car might have been parked with two men as passengers
and so many logical explanations therefor, that to say the
very sight of two men in a parked automobile at night warrants a police investigation reminds one of the Gestapo.
Since when has there been a curfew for adults' Since when
has it been illegal for two men to converse at night in a parked
automobile' Since the deplorable practice of "buggil1g"
hotel rooms, private homes and offices and tapping telephone
lines has become so prevalent, almost the only place two businessmen, who wish their conversation to remain private, can
be safe is in an automobile on a sparsely traveled street or
other secluded place. And. if their mere presence in a parked
automobile is held to warrant police investigation, it appears
that private conversations must also be held illegal and the
right of privacy nonexistent.
It must be remembered that the Fourth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States was adopted for the
protection of all of the people of this country, and that
section 19 of article I of the Constitution of California was
adopted for the protection of all of the people of this state.
The object and purpose of the framers of these constitutional
mandates was to guarantee and make secure the fundamental
right of privacy to every person-the right to be secure
against police surveillance unless the police have reasonable
cause to believe that an offense is being committed. This
does not mean mere suspicion as some of our courts have
recently indicated. The obvious reason for the rule that
evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search, cannot
be used against the victim of the search, is to protect innocent
people by discouraging such searches. It is a matter of common knowledge that it has been the practice of law enforcement officers of this state to make searches of the persons
and property of individuals whenever they saw fit regardless
of whether reasonable or any cause existed, and many innocent people have been subjected to the indignity and humiliation of having their persons, homes, offices and automobiles
searched by law enforcement officers with impunity when
nothing of an incriminating nature was found and no arrests
or prosecutions resulted therefrom. Many of these invasions
of the constitutional right of privacy received no public
mention because the victims did not wish to incur the expense
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and endure the inconvenience and publicity incidental to
seeking redress in the courts. It is probable that for every
case where evidence of a crime has been found there have
been numerous illegal searches which uncovered no evidence
whatsover, and we know from the reported cases that the
practice of illegal searches in this state has increased many
fold in recent years. The American way of life does not
lend itself to such totalitarian practices. There is no place
in our body politic for the Gestapo, the storm trooper or the
commissar. Ours is a system of ordered liberty which is
made more secure by placing a magistrate between the citizens
and the overzealous law enforcement officer. While this
system must protect the guilty as well as the innocent against
an unlawful search and seizure, its effect on criminal prosecutions in this field is no different than any of the other safeguards embraced in the Bill of Rights which are designed
to protect the life, liberty and property of our people against
deprivation without due process of law. Each and everyone
of these safeguards operates as an impediment against the
conviction of the guilty as well as the innocent. Yet, this
is necessary in any system of ordered liberty. If the above
mentioned constitutional provisions have any meaning whatsoever, then the victim of an illegal search may assert the
right of privacy guaranteed t.o him and resist such search.
If he does so, either he or the officer may be injured or killed.
If this should occur, where should the blame fall f Obviously,
a prosecutor who favors such illegal conduct on the part of
law enforcement officers would be disposed to prosecute the
victim of the illegal search if he should injure or kill the
officer in his effort to resist the search, and would not prosecute the officer who injured or killed the victim in the
forcible execution of his illegal project.
From the intemperate and misleading statements appearing in the public press recently as having been made by heads
of police departments and prosecuting officers of this state
against the rule in the Cahan ease, we are forced to assume
that they feel that great credit and high praise should go
to those law enforcing officers who ruthlessly violate the above
mentioned constitutional guarantees, and that hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy should be heaped upon those
who insist upon their observance and preservation. I will
again repeat what I have said many times both as a private
citizen and as a public official of this state, that I have a
sincere devotion to the American system for the administration of justice as postulated by the Constitution of the United
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States and the Bill of Rights; that I can conceive of no
emergency short of a threat to our national security which
would justify striking down any of the safeguards for the
protection of the rights of the people embraced within that
system. The impediments against law enforcement, the
escape of some criminals from conviction and punishment,
and the cost to the public incidental to the operation of such
a system, fades into insignificance when we offset and balance
against those factors the glorious feeling which stems from
the consciousness that, because of this system, we live in an
atmosphere where we may enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness with dignity and self-respect, secure against
any invasion of our fundamental personal rights without
due process of law.
The elder Pitt, in his speech on the Excise Tax, gave
expression to what later became the Fourth Amendment.
What he said then is just as important today. He said that
"The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the
forces of the crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
winds may blow through it; the storms may enter; the rain
may enter-but the King of England cannot enter. All his
forces cannot cross the threshold of the ruined tenement."
Yet, prior to the decision in the Cahan case, the police and
other so-called law enforcement officers in California could
ruthlessly force their way into the home of a private citizen,
and without a search warrant, seize whatever they found and
use it as evidence in our courts notwithstanding they violated
the constitutional right-the right of privacy-of the citizen
in obtaining it.
Another great Englishman, Lord Coke, had this to say
on this same subject: "The house of everyone is to him as his
castle and fortress, as well for his defense against injury and
violence as for his repose."
Mr. Justice Holmes, in his great dissent in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469, 470 [48 8.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed.
944, 66 A.L.R. 376], had this to say: "But I think, as Mr.
Justice Brandeis says, that apart from the Constitution the
government ought not to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act. . . . [W] e must consider the two
objects of desire, both of which we cannot have and make
up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals
should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence
should be used. It also is desirable that the government
should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they
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are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If
it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime I do
not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the
same way, and I can attach no importance to protest.ations of
disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces
that in future it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose,
and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the government shouUl play an
ignoble part." (Emphasis added.)
I am in full accord with the views expressed by Mr. Justice
Traynor, in People v. Simon, 45 Ca1.2d 645, 650 [290 P.2d
531], where he said: "In the present case the officer searched
first and asked questions only after his search uncovered the
incriminating cigarette, and there is nothing to indicate that
had he confined himself to a reasonable inquiry, he would
have discovered anything to confirm his suspicion that defendant had no lawful right to be where he was.
"Under these circumstances, to permit an officer to justify
a search on the ground that he 'didn't feel' that a person
on the street at night had any lawful business there would
expose anyone to having his person searched by any suspicious
officer no matter how unfounded the suspicions were. Innocent people, going fo or from evening jobs 0'1' entertainmellt,
or walkillg for exercise or enjoyment, would suffer along with
the occasional criminal who would be turned up. As pointed
out by Mr. Justice Jackson in a similar case, 'We meet in this
case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. It is said that if
such arrests and searches cannot be made, law enforcement
will be more difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers,
after consulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating
police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater
danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals
from punishment. Taking the law as it has been given to us,
this arrest and search were beyond the lawful authority of
those who executed them.' (Ullited States v. Di Re, supra,
332 U.S. 581, 595 [68 S.Ot. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210].)" (Emphasis
added.) In Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Ca1.App. 13, 16, 17 [98 P.
43], the court said: "A police officer has a right to make
inquiry in a proper manner of anyone upon the public streets
at a late hour as to his identity and the occasion of his presence, if the surroundings are such as to indicate to a reasonable
man that the public safety demands such identification. The
fact that crimes had recently been committed in that neigh-
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borhood; that plaintiff at a late hour was found in the
locality; that he refused to answer proper questions establishing his identity, were circumstances which should lead a
reasonable officer to require his presence at ·the station, where
the sergeant in charge might make more minute and careful
inquiry." (Emphasis added. ) Here, eyen after the chase, the
suspects were not questioned-they were ordered to put their
hands in front of them, and ordered to get out of the car.
To bolster its theory that the '\"ery sight of the two men
in a parked car justified a police in'\"estigation, the majority
relies on their flight from the officers. In United Sfof,es v.
Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106, the officers involved had been
ordered by police headquarters to watch a certain building
where it was suspected a still was being operated. Twomen
came out of the building and were followed by the officers
who lost them. They went back to the building and the
chase, or flight, ensued when the two men returned there.
It is obvious from a reading of the case that the facts there
showed more than the presence of two men in a car to warrant
the search. In Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 [51
S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407], the facts showed
that on the day of petitioner's arrest, the officer had received information that Rusty had two loads of liquor in
certain described automobiles which were parked in "particular places on named streets." The court held that the
information received prior to the arrest was sufficient to show
probable cause for the arrest. In the instant case, we have
only the fact that two men were parked in an automobile at
night and their flight from the investigating officers to establish probable cause. In Talley v. United States, 159 F.2d 703,
the court noted that "there was advance information sufficient in itself to justify the search. But, more than that,
there was actual evidence of conduct, including flight, transpiring in the presence of the officers" to justify their search.
In Levine v. United States, 138 F.2d 627, there was also advance, reliable information that the appellant had illegal
possession of alcohol prior to the search by the officers. In
Jones v. United States, 131 F.2d 539, probable cause for the
search was found to exist because the officers had kept the
accused premises under surveillance for about three months
prior thereto. .
From the summary set forth above of the eases relied on
by the majority it appears that they are readily distinguishable. In all of them there was advance information that

